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Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), Infrastructure Concessions, CodicedegliAppalti, Italian Infrastructure Governance, Civil Law Regulatory Systems, Transaction Cost Economics, Resource Dependence Theory, Qualitative Legal Research, Regulatory Risk Allocation, Public Procurement Law, Project Finance in Regulated Sectors, Administrative Bottlenecks in PPPs.

In the context of Europe’s shifting infrastructure landscape—marked by fiscal constraints, growing reliance on private capital, and evolving EU-level mandates—public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as a key mechanism for financing and delivering major public works. Nowhere is this trend more visible than in Italy, where concession contracts are widely used in sectors such as transport, mobility, and airports. Yet while the legal and financial structures of PPPs have been studied extensively in isolation, relatively little research explores how legal frameworks, risk allocation, and managerial practices interact throughout the lifecycle of a concession project—particularly in civil law systems like Italy’s.This paper addresses that gap by investigating the evolution and implementation of Italy’s regulatory and legislative framework for public infrastructure concessions. Two central research questions guide the analysis: (1) How has the Italian concession model, as codified through the CodicedegliAppalti and EU procurement directives, developed in response to shifting economic and institutional pressures? (2) How do public and private actors interpret and apply this framework in practice, especially in high-stakes infrastructure environments?

Methodologically, the study combines doctrinal legal analysis with qualitative empirical research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior finance professionals in major concessionaire firms operating in Italy, offering grounded insights into the day-to-day application of legal norms, project finance principles, and regulatory compliance. These interviews were thematically coded and cross-referenced against legislative sources to identify consistencies, gaps, and operational challenges.

The findings suggest that while the formal structure of Italy’s concession system is designed to promote transparency, accountability, and balanced risk-sharing, its real-world application is often uneven. Administrative delays, ambiguous legal provisions, and inconsistent interpretation across jurisdictions introduce friction into project delivery. Using Resource Dependence Theory and Transaction Cost Economics as analytical lenses, the paper interprets these frictions as structural features of high-asset-specificity, public-private governance systems rather than simple implementation failures.

This research contributes a context-specific, interdisciplinary framework for understanding concessions in civil law environments. It also provides actionable insights for regulators, concessionaires, and financial institutions seeking to navigate the increasingly complex field of infrastructure delivery under public-private arrangements. By drawing together legal analysis, theoretical reflection, and practitioner experience, the paper aims to advance both scholarly debate and practical policymaking in the domain of public infrastructure governance.